AERIAL SURVEILLANCE SAFETY IN THE CONTEXT OF AMBUSHED FPV THREATS ON MOTORWAYS: A RISK-BASED COUNTERMEASURE MODEL

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.32782/2956-333X/2025-3-7

Keywords:

UAV, carrier configurations, swarm connections, electronic warfare, electromagnetic silence, camouflage, communication hygiene, operational security, counter-FPV, SOP, situational awareness

Abstract

The article is devoted to the study of aerial reconnaissance safety in conditions of ambush FPV threats on motorways, when strike UAVs wait for a long time on the roadside and strike targets as vehicles approach.It justifies a risk-based approach to convoy escort planning, shifting the focus from radio jamming to managing environmental vulnerabilities, reducing route predictability, and standardised SOPs. The scientific novelty lies in the integration of EMCON/OPSEC, engineering barriers, and close-range counter-FPV.Key factors in the effectiveness of ambush FPVs have been identified: exploitation of electronic warfare dead zones in the ground layer, wired or low-emission control, motion sensors for energy conservation and rapid response, and spatial conditions that facilitate concealment of the carrier, cable, and operator position. The limitations of the ‘jamming anything’ paradigm and the advisability of focusing on preventive risk mapping, movement variability, and minimisation of electromagnetic emissions are demonstrated.The structure of multi-layered countermeasures is investigated, combining organisational solutions (passage windows, time and speed profiling, checklists), engineering and sensor means (‘digital pickets’, roadside and cavity inspections, IR control from a suspension), and tactical escort algorithms with the allocation of close counter-FPV crews and a contour for detecting ambush operators with logistics damage. Effectiveness metrics are proposed for assessing route stability and SOP adaptation.The application of a risk-oriented model in three environments – open plain, forest belt, urban development – is analysed, taking into account lines of sight, multi-beam and relief screening, which form ‘pockets’ of low electronic warfare effectiveness. The practical value of SOPs with the fixation of emission ‘windows’, attack vector breaking algorithms, and incident analysis is substantiated. The proposed approach reduces the risk of a successful UAV operation and increases the survivability of aerial reconnaissance and transport convoys.

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Published

2025-12-11